Ronald Dworkin was a distinguished legal scholar with a focus on american philosophy and constitutional law, who advocated for a moral interpretation of the law. In an article he wrote for the University of Chicago Law Review in 1967 he stated:Why do we call what “the law” says a matter of legal “obligation”? Is “obligation” here just a term of art, meaning only “what the law says”? Or does legal obligation have something to do with moral obligation? Can we say that we have, in principle at least, the same reasons for meeting our legal obligations that we have for meeting our moral obligations?
Dworkin, who died Thursday, February 14 at age 81, was a professor of law at New York University and emeritus professor at University of College London. A Wall Street Journal article titled Scholar Argued For Moral Understanding of Law, published on February 15, 2013, stated: “According to the Journal of Legal Studies, he was the second-most cited legal scholar of the 20th century after 7th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Richard Posner, a frequent sparring partner.”
After conducting an author search, we found 43 of Mr. Dworkin’s articles are available in HeinOnline. The article mentioned above from the University of Chicago Law Review was cited 252 times by other articles in HeinOnline’s Law Journal Library. Mr. Dworkin’s articles (in HeinOnline) have been cited a total of 2797 times by other articles, making him the 85th most-cited author in HeinOnline’s Law Journal Library. His most cited article is Hard Cases from a 1975 Harvard Law Review issue at 88 Harv. L. Rev. 1057 (1974-1975), which has been cited 376 times.